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“Historically, the great strength of the U.S. economic and political 
system has been its ability, in the face of scandal, to reform and 
heal itself. Indeed, we have often needed scandals to trigger 
reform.”1 
 
“Regulators have power to reduce excessive risk taking and broad 
powers to order remedies concerning risk-taking innovation. 
Financial regulators hold broad power to determine legal 
violations in the financial sector.”2 
                                                                                                     
 *  Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee 
College of Law; A.B. 1982, Brown University; J.D. 1985, New York University 
School of Law.  
 1.  Harvey J. Goldschmid, The SEC at 70: Let’s Celebrate Its Reinvigorated 
Golden Years, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 825 (2005). 
 2.  Kristin Johnson et al., Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd–Frank 
Section 342 Help Stabilize the Financial Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 
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“[T]he SEC routinely exercises its regulatory power to achieve 
superior compliance, risk management, and corporate governance 
in wayward registrants and regulated entities.”3 
I. Diversity in Governance Matters: A Herculean and Worthy 
Undertaking 
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 predictably catalyzed 
a federal legislative and regulatory response.4 In some respects, 
that response afforded federal agencies new regulatory authority; 
in other respects, that response employed existing agency 
authority in new ways. Regardless, the regulatory process may 
have frustrated—or at least not have given full effect to—
congressional intent or authorization, with the possible result 
that (for this and other reasons) the causes of the financial crisis 
may not have been completely addressed. However, financial 
regulators may yet pave the way forward. 
In Diversifying to Mitigate Risk,5 Professors Kristin Johnson, 
Steven A. Ramirez, and Cary Martin Shelby suggest a 
non-obvious path to a more stable national financial future. The 
article takes on an enormous task relevant to financial regulatory 
reform arising out of the financial crisis. That task ultimately 
involves harnessing and channeling federal financial regulatory 
authority to manage financial market risk. The issue and line of 
attack are well known. Yet, comprehensive, realizable solutions 
have been elusive. 
The approach of these authors is innovative and focuses on 
integrating issues of market risk with literature promoting 
diversity in firm governance. In Diversifying to Mitigate Risk, the 
authors first demonstrate that diversity in financial firm 
governance is important as a risk management device.6 That, in 
and of itself, is a tall order. However, the authors do not stop 
there. They then proceed to contend that Congress intended in 
passing the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
                                                                                                     
1851 (2016). 
 3.  See id. at 1865 (describing the response). 
 4.  Id. at 1796. 
 5.  Id. at 1795. 
 6.  Id. at 1840–51. 
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Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank)7 to delegate to financial 
regulators the task of employing diversity as a risk management 
device through the mandate in Section 342(b)(2)(C) of 
Dodd-Frank (Section 342).8 More specifically, they argue that 
Section 342 requires financial regulators to evaluate “the 
diversity policies and practices”9 of regulated entities rather than 
allowing firms to self-assess these policies and practices under 
regulatory guidelines. Because federal financial regulators chose 
the self-regulation route, the authors conclude that federal 
regulators have not complied adequately with Congress’s Section 
342 mandate. 
[T]he diversity initiative embodied in Section 342 . . . holds the 
promise of enhanced financial performance as well as risk 
mitigation. In fact . . . powerful evidence suggests that 
diversity particularly leads to superior risk management 
during periods of financial turbulence such as the financial 
crisis. . . . Unfortunately, . . . the financial regulators ignored 
this lesson and materially diluted the impact of the statutory 
provision.10 
As the authors note in the article, a former commissioner of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Louis Aguilar, 
shares their concern.11 
Overall, the argument in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk is 
well-documented (offering valuable citations to supporting 
literature) and thorough. As someone who has written about the 
merits of gender and other diversity based on matters of trust12 
and crowd theory,13 much of what the article says about the value 
of diversity in business governance decision-making resonates 
                                                                                                     
 7.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–03), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreet reform-cpa.pdf.  
 8.  See id. § 342(b)(2)(C). 
 9. Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1803. 
 10.  Id. at 1838–39 (footnotes omitted). 
 11.  See id. at 1839 n.219. 
 12.  See generally, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and Corporate 
Boards, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 173 (2007). 
 13.  See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Women in the Crowd of 
Corporate Directors: Following, Walking Alone, and Meaningfully Contributing, 
21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59 (2014) (explaining crowd theory particularly 
as it relates to women in corporate governance). 
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with me. Moreover, I find the article’s linkage of diversity and 
market risk to Section 342’s mandate both creative and 
provocative, even if the authors’ precise expressed prescription as 
to the use of the SEC’s regulatory authority is, as yet, only 
generally articulated in the article. 
I do, however, have several relatively narrowly drawn 
critiques of the portion of the article in which the authors make 
assertions about the broad scope of financial regulatory authority 
that enables financial regulators to use diversity more directly as 
a risk-management tool. As a general matter, the authors argue 
that “[r]egulators have power to reduce excessive risk taking and 
broad powers to order remedies concerning risk-taking 
innovation. Financial regulators hold broad power to determine 
legal violations in the financial sector.”14 I agree with the general 
contention, but in general, I am concerned that it is not 
effectively defended. Specifically, the article offers supportive 
examples from banking and securities regulation. Securities 
regulation is my primary area of practice and a body of rules 
about which I frequently write. Accordingly, my comments relate 
to the observations made in the article about the regulatory 
authority of the SEC under U.S. federal securities regulation. 
My appraisal of the authors’ treatment of SEC authority in 
Diversifying to Mitigate Risk proceeds in two principal 
substantive parts. First, in Part II, I address the absence of clear 
articulations in the article of the policies underlying and tools of 
regulation under the two most salient federal securities laws. 
Then, in Part III, I note that one of the examples provided by the 
authors in the prescriptive part of Diversifying to Mitigate Risk 
invokes two additional federal securities laws with different 
underlying policies and operative regulatory tools that also 
should be, but have not been, explored by the authors. Finally, I 
offer a brief conclusion. 
To be clear at the outset, none of the critique offered in this 
response to Diversifying to Mitigate Risk goes to the heart of the 
authors’ thesis. Moreover, their work in this article is both 
important and useful. My ultimate objective in undertaking this 
commentary is to offer additional support for the authors’ 
argument.  
                                                                                                     
 14.  Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1851. 
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II. Missed Opportunities: Policies and Tools under the 1933 Act 
and the 1934 Act 
As a securities lawyer and erstwhile student of institutional 
reform at the SEC,15 I admit to some disappointment with the 
level of analysis afforded to policy and related regulatory tools in 
the article’s suggested securities regulation response. That 
response comes late in the piece (in the last eight pages of the 
article, under the subsection heading “The SEC and the 
Securities Industry”)16 and fails to sufficiently address what I 
consider to be the core values—policies and regulatory tools—of 
securities regulation under the two key federal laws governing 
securities offerings and trading: the Securities Act of 1933, as 
amended (the 1933 Act),17 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as amended (the 1934 Act).18 “These acts and the 
Commission itself remain the fundamental foundations that 
make our securities regulation system work today.”19 
The authors begin this important part of their article—
concluding with prescriptions for the use of the SEC’s vast 
regulatory authority—with a weak premise. Specifically, they 
assert that “[t]he SEC’s main concern is legal compliance and 
regulatory risk.”20 The limited support provided for this 
statement in the appended footnote, which refers to a “Fast 
Answers” page from the SEC’s website that addresses only the 
1933 Act (from which no examples are drawn in this part of the 
article), is inadequate to the introductory function it is intended 
to serve. 
It would be appropriate to begin this portion of the article 
with a brief recitation of the nature and broad-based statutory 
                                                                                                     
 15.  See generally, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sustaining Reform 
Efforts at the SEC: A Progress Report, 30 BANKING & FIN. SVCS. POL’Y REP. 1 
(Apr. 2011) (describing and evaluating the progress of SEC reforms efforts); 
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and Reforming the Securities and 
Exchange Commission: Lessons from Literature on Change Leadership, 55 
VILLANOVA L. REV. 627 (2010) (assessing SEC reform efforts through the lens of 
change leadership). 
 16.  Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1860–67. 
 17.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z-3 (2012). 
 18.  Id. §§ 78a–78qq. 
 19. Goldschmid, supra note 1, at 826. 
 20.  Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1860. 
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authority of the SEC. The SEC was established in Section 4 of the 
1934 Act as an independent federal agency.21 The broad scope of 
the SEC’s authority over federal securities regulation is 
evidenced by the many congressional enactments that reference 
the obligations or permissive powers. These include, for example, 
the general 
power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter [the 
1934 Act] for which they are responsible or for the execution of 
the functions vested in them by this chapter, and may for such 
purposes classify persons, securities, transactions, statements, 
applications, reports, and other matters within their 
respective jurisdictions, and prescribe greater, lesser, or 
different requirements for different classes thereof.22  
This general statutory foundation for the SEC’s authority to 
regulate establish provides a strong underpinning for the 
argument in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk that the SEC can police 
board diversity in regulated entities. 
Other relevant general manifestations in the 1934 Act of the 
wide-ranging authority of the SEC include those in Sections 21 
and 22 regarding the conduct of investigations, enforcement 
actions, and hearings.23 Although perhaps less relevant to this 
article, the SEC’s general authority to “conditionally or 
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or 
any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from 
any provision or provisions of this chapter [the 1934 Act] or of 
any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such 
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and 
is consistent with the protection of investors”24 is a further 
indication of the breadth and depth of its statutory powers. The 
SEC has similarly broad authority to regulate offers and sales of 
securities under the 1933 Act.25 Successful challenges to the 
                                                                                                     
 21.  15 U.S.C. § 78d. 
 22.  Id. § 78w. 
 23.  See id. §§ 78u & 78v. 
 24.  Id. § 78mm. 
 25.  See, e.g., id. § 77s (general rulemaking authority); id. § 77t 
(investigations, injunctions, prosecutions, and other enforcement authority); id. 
§ 77u (authority to hold hearings); id. § 77z-3 (general authority over 
exemptions). 
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SEC’s authority under these provisions have been relatively 
rare.26 
The authors also could have laid a more robust foundation for 
their recommendations by establishing and offering citational 
support for the general tools of federal securities regulation under 
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act and the regulatory policies these 
tools serve. I have collected and acknowledged these tools and 
policies in prior work: 
[M]andatory disclosure has been and continues to be a key 
regulatory tool in U.S. securities regulation. Along with the 
prevention of fraud and other misleading conduct and the 
substantive regulation of market participants, disclosure 
mandates under securities laws and rules . . . serve to protect 
investors, maintain the integrity of securities markets, and 
encourage capital formation. These are the core policy 
objectives of securities regulation.27 
As Diversifying to Mitigate Risk argues, direct SEC efforts to 
ensure diversity in financial firm governance constitute 
substantive regulation geared to safeguard investors, ensure fair 
markets, and foster the development of capital. 
The breadth and depth of the SEC’s authority to regulate 
broker-dealers and other financial intermediaries, the central 
examples used by the authors in this part of the article, are 
amply supported by the general and specific statements of 
statutory authority in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act and the 
three articulated core policy objectives underlying U.S. federal 
securities regulation. Moreover, the SEC’s authority to revoke the 
registration of broker-dealers is a specific manifestation of 
substantive regulation. From a stronger statutory, regulatory, 
and policy foundation, the article can better proceed with its 
examples of the SEC’s exceptional power to both “give” and “take 
                                                                                                     
 26.  See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. 
Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of 
Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Bus. Roundtable 
v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 27.  Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the 
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 828 
(2014) (footnotes omitted); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security 
in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 335, 337–41, 345 (2012) 
(offering a general overview of the purposes of security regulation in the United 
States). 
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away” as gatekeepers of the very existence and scope of activities 
of regulated financial firms and its specific illustrations of “the 
power of the federal financial regulators over the internal 
governance of firms they regulate.”28 
III. Distinctions with a Difference: The Regulation of Investment 
Advisers and Investment Companies 
The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are only two of the six federal 
securities laws adopted in response to the 1929 stock market 
crash.29 A seventh act was enacted in 1970.30 The SEC enjoys 
regulatory authority under all seven federal securities laws.31 The 
1933 Act and 1934 Act, taken alone, do not provide a sufficient 
foundation for all of the examples offered by the authors as 
illustrations of the breadth and depth of the SEC’s regulatory 
authority. But the seven acts taken as a whole support the 
authors’ contentions. 
Specifically, the Putnam Investment Management LLC 
settlement referenced in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk exemplifies 
the SEC’s authority under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
as amended (the Investment Advisers Act),32 and the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, as amended (the Investment Company 
Act).33 As with the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, the Investment 
Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act establish the 
scope of the SEC’s overall authority in multiple sections.34 
Moreover, these two additional securities laws have, their own, 
unique policy underpinnings and use distinctive regulatory tools 
                                                                                                     
 28.  Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1862. 
 29.  See Joel Seligman, Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for 
Independent Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (“The New 
Deal’s six federal securities laws were a response to the 1929-1933 stock market 
crash.”). 
 30.  Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and 
Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 450 n.2 (2002). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012). 
 33.  Id. §§ 80a-1–80a-64. 
 34.  See, e.g., id. § 80b-9 (enforcement authority); id. § 80b-11 (rulemaking 
authority); id. § 80a-37 (rulemaking authority); id. § 80a-41 (enforcement 
authority). 
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that are largely unexplored in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk as 
foundations for the authors arguments about the scope of the 
SEC’s authority to regulate the internal governance of financial 
institutions. 
For example, “[t]he policy of the Investment Advisers Act is 
to protect investors from potential ‘malpractices’ on the part of 
investment advisers.”35 More expansively: 
The Investment Advisers Act essentially reflects a 
congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship, as well as an intent to 
eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest that 
might induce investment advisers, consciously or 
unconsciously, to render advice that was not disinterested. The 
Investment Advisers Act clearly was enacted for the protection 
of investors and was intended to promote full and accurate 
disclosure of all material facts by investment advisers. In 
summary, the Investment Advisers Act imposes a fiduciary 
duty upon investment advisers when dealing with their clients 
and prohibits them from violating this duty by engaging in 
fraudulent and deceitful practices.36 
This investor protection focus, implemented primarily 
through disclosure, is shared with securities regulation under the 
1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Yet, other policies and tools of 
regulation under the Investment Advisers Act, enacted more than 
six years after adoption of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, 
emanate from perceived gaps in the then existing regulatory 
framework and rely on distinct observations about the role of 
investment advisers in financial markets and the economy as a 
whole.37 The contextual origins of and policies underlying the 
                                                                                                     
 35.  Dean L. Bussey, Securities Regulation-Performance Fees Under the 
Investment Advisers Act: The Inadequacy of Disclosure Provisions, 11 J. CORP. L. 
457, 459 (1986). 
 36.  Id. at 460 (footnotes omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-4 (setting forth 
reporting responsibilities); id. § 80b-4a (requiring policies and procedures to 
prevent the misuse of nonpublic information); id. § 80b-7 (making willful 
material misstatements and willful misleading material omissions unlawful). 
 37.  See, e.g., Steven L. Jones, Custodial Collies of Transparency—the 
Competitive Advantage of Protecting Investing Lamm(Bs) from Advising Wolves: 
Lamm v. State Street Bank & Trust, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1119, 1128 (2015) (“The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . was a Congressional effort . . . to prevent 
and eradicate fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative practices by investment 
advisers.”); Elliot J. Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the 
Williams Act’s Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1098 
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Investment Advisers Act, as well as its disclosure mandates and 
additional regulatory tools, may or may not ultimately impact the 
authors’ argument about the SEC’s authority to regulate the 
internal governance of investment advisers. Regardless, the 
absence of any analysis is conspicuous. 
Similarly, the Investment Company Act occupies an 
overlapping, yet distinct, regulatory space as among the U.S. 
federal securities laws. The distinctions provide an opportunity 
for significantly clearer and more pointed observations than one 
can easily make with respect to the Investment Advisers Act. The 
Investment Company Act “regulates the activities of investment 
companies both in offering securities to investors and in its 
governance and investment activities.”38 The act itself expressly 
regulates the internal governance of registered investment 
companies in a number of ways.39 
[T]he Investment Company Act places its principal reliance on 
independent directors, rather than on direct shareholder 
democracy or administrative agency oversight. Not only does 
the Act require that forty percent of a fund’s board be 
composed of independent outside directors (and in some 
circumstances dictate that a majority be independent), but it 
assigns specific duties to these independent directors and thus 
takes them away from the discretion of the board as a whole.40 
Arguably, the Investment Company Act’s policy 
underpinnings and its express statutory regulation of investment 
company internal governance provide more direct support for the 
authors’ contention in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk that the 
                                                                                                     
n.69 (1982) (“[T]he Investment Advisers Act . . . establishes a fiduciary 
relationship between investment advisers and their clients”).  
 38.  Joseph A. Franco, The Investment Company Act’s Definition of 
“Security” and the Myth of Equivalence, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 37 (2001). 
 39.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10 (addressing director independence); id. § 
80a-16 (setting forth requirements for the election of investment company 
directors); id. § 80a-55 (regulating board composition based on affiliation and 
other interests). 
 40.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation 
and A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 288 (1981) 
(footnotes omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1(b) (offering an express, relatively 
detailed, general statutory statement of policy listing adverse effects on “the 
national public interest and the interest of investors”); id. 80a-10 (addressing, as 
indicated by its title, “[a]ffiliations or interest of directors, officers, and 
employees”). 
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SEC’s overall regulatory authority permits it to control the 
internal affairs of the firms it regulates. “[T]he Investment 
Company Act of 1940 established a strong corporate governance 
framework for investment companies from the very beginning.”41 
On the other hand, one might be able to argue that the express 
statutory provision of internal governance rules in the 
Investment Company Act militates against the implied existence 
of broad SEC regulatory authority over matters of internal 
governance elsewhere in the Investment Company Act or under 
other federal securities laws.  
These matters under the Investment Advisers Act and the 
Investment Company Act beg for analysis. The Investment 
Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act have distinct 
statutory provisions, and they were proposed for adoption to 
address concerns different from those to which the provisions of 
1933 Act and the 1934 Act are directed. The statutes rest on 
different policy foundations and use different regulatory tools. 
While the existence of differences in regulatory authority over 
different financial intermediaries is explicitly recognized in 
Diversifying to Mitigate Risk,42 the implications of those 
differences are not fully addressed. At a minimum, the unique 
position of Investment Company Act regulation merits special 
treatment as a statutory basis for regulatory incursions into firm 
governance. 
IV. Conclusion 
In sum, I have significant praise for the scope and overall 
argument of Diversifying to Mitigate Risk. However, I find the 
article’s analysis of the SEC’s capacity to regulate internal 
governance to be lacking in depth and specificity. Optimally, the 
authors of Diversifying to Mitigate Risk would have more clearly 
                                                                                                     
 41.  Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Fund Director in 
2016: Keynote Address at the Mutual Fund Directors Forum 2016 Policy 
Conference (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-
mutual-fund-directors-forum-3-29-16.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42.  See Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1863 (“The SEC regulatory scheme 
with respect to each of these different types of financial institutions differs in 
important ways.”). 
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and individually articulated the statutory bases for the SEC’s 
authority to regulate financial services firms under relevant 
statutes, the policies underlying the SEC’s regulation of specific 
financial institutions, and the tools employed in those regulatory 
schemes. Clear, individual articulations would provide more 
concrete support for the authors’ claim that the SEC’s authority 
is broad enough to encompass the management of the internal 
governance structures and attributes of regulated entities  
Nevertheless, my criticisms regarding the substantiation of 
broad-based SEC authority in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk do not 
take away in any substantial respect from the general point made 
by the authors that the SEC’s broad authority to register and 
revoke the registration of financial intermediaries, read together 
with Section 342, affords the SEC the power to engage in 
assessments of the diversity policies and practices of the firms it 
regulates. They argue from this point and from the literature on 
governance diversity that, in the wake of a global financial crisis 
in which non-diverse financial institutions played leading roles, 
the authority of financial regulators, including the SEC, should 
be used to manage risk by managing diversity in the governance 
of regulated entities. They are motivated in large part by their 
conclusion that “[a] more diverse financial sector is bound to 
allocate capital better, achieve greater systemic stability, and 
meet the public’s expectations of the financial sector.”43 That 
conclusion is supported by the overall weight of authority 
presented in the article and provides a basis for hope that 
financial regulators can help the U.S. economic system reform 
itself by better mitigating risk. Let’s hope that the regulators 
accept the challenge and that these authors are correct.  
 
                                                                                                     
 43.  Id. at 1868. 
